LUNR
Intuitive Machines is an early-stage space infrastructure contractor trying to move from lunar mission specialist into a broader prime-contractor model spanning lunar delivery, spacecraft manufacturing, communications and navigation networks, mission operations, and national-security adjacent programs. The valuation setup is demanding rather than discounted: the loader shows a $27.58 current share price, local street targets centered around $23.78 mean and $24.00 median, and peer comparisons that describe roughly 24.5x EV/revenue and 20.9x sales despite negative margins, negative free cash flow, weak current returns, and no usable earnings-based valuation support. What must go right is substantial: backlog must convert into revenue with better gross margins, mission execution must stay clean, KinetX and Lanteris must integrate into a coherent platform, and the February 2026 strategic investment in satellite communications and in-space data processing must create durable higher-margin services revenue rather than another capital-intensive project. The bull case is that lunar heritage, spacecraft platforms, network services, and government demand compound into a real space infrastructure franchise with positive operating cash flow and better repeatability. The bear case is that mission timing, cost overruns, procurement delays, acquisition complexity, and ongoing cash burn leave the company valued on a future platform that has not yet been economically proven. Overall, LUNR has meaningful strategic optionality, but the loader-provided scenario work points to a bear-leaning risk-reward because the current price already capitalizes much of the future prime-contractor story before margins, cash conversion, and recurring service economics have caught up.
The local financial work argues for a highly execution-sensitive outlook. Revenue growth is currently negative on a trailing basis, margins are deeply below established aerospace peers, and the business still posts meaningful losses, so near-term earnings quality remains weak. The path to a better outlook depends on backlog conversion, cleaner contract execution, improved manufacturing control after vertical integration, and gradually shifting mix toward higher-margin network and services revenues rather than relying mainly on hardware milestones.
Intuitive Machines is trying to evolve from a niche lunar-landing contractor into a broader space infrastructure prime with capabilities spanning spacecraft manufacturing, lunar delivery, communications and navigation networks, and mission operations. The long case depends on management converting mission heritage and recent acquisitions into a repeatable government-and-defense contractor model where services, networks, and standard spacecraft platforms become more valuable than one-off lunar events. If that transition works, Intuitive Machines can become a much larger addressable-market story than the legacy CLPS framing implies.
A key catalyst is the company’s February 2026 $175 million strategic investment intended to advance satellite communications and in-space data processing capabilities. Management tied the investment directly to expanding its Near Space Network Services ambitions and supporting higher-power on-orbit data processing and edge-computing capabilities. If that capital helps accelerate communications-network deployment and satellite platform commercialization, it could strengthen the case that Intuitive Machines is building persistent infrastructure in cislunar and adjacent space markets rather than simply chasing episodic mission awards.
Current Price
$29.36
Expected Value
$41.89
Implied Move
+42.7%
Current vs low/median/mean/high target prices
Top: Street estimate level by period (low to high with mean). Bottom: source-provided estimate change metric (%).
Sources: yfinance_parsed_snapshots, valuation.street_targets
With the stock at about $25.53, above both the mean target near $23.8 and the median target near $24, the market is already pricing in a future that exceeds current street expectations. That is an aggressive posture because the local financials still show trailing revenue down about 18% versus the latest annual comparison, while the business remains far from demonstrating stable operating economics. Investors are clearly looking through the present numbers toward backlog conversion, acquisition-driven scale, and a broader space-infrastructure opportunity, but the current quote already capitalizes a good portion of that hope. The burden therefore is not on management to stabilize a discounted situation, but to beat an already elevated narrative. The company may eventually grow into that optimism if newer programs, network services, and acquired capabilities scale quickly, yet the present evidence still supports a prove-it rather than a confidence-underwritten growth case. For a buy-side PM, the stock looks priced for future strategic relevance before the cash economics have validated it.
Driver contributions from revenue to net income
The market is implicitly assuming that today’s very weak profitability is temporary and that Intuitive Machines can mature into a materially better margin structure over the next few years. That is a large leap from the local numbers, which still show gross margin of only about 4%, operating margin near negative 74%, and a net margin near negative 40%. Those figures do not describe a business on the verge of normal aerospace profitability; they describe a company still absorbing the cost of proving its model. The bull case is that mission cadence, vertical integration, and a richer mix of services eventually change the income statement dramatically, but current fundamentals do not yet justify underwriting that outcome with confidence. Because the stock is already above consensus, investors are not being paid to wait for that proof in the way they would be with a depressed multiple. For portfolio purposes, the profitability setup argues that the market is being optimistic, not merely patient.
Intuitive Machines is trying to evolve from a lunar mission specialist into a broader space infrastructure and spacecraft prime, which raises execution risk because the company must simultaneously deliver complex missions, integrate acquisitions, expand manufacturing, and prove that one-off contract wins can become repeatable platform economics. The business benefits from early lunar heritage and a broader product set, but those advantages remain fragile in an industry where a single mission failure, launch slip, or systems integration problem can damage future award credibility. Because the operating model is still engineering-heavy and milestone-driven, any misstep in backlog conversion, mission readiness, or acquired-platform integration could interrupt revenue momentum before the company establishes durable recurring service revenue.
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Intuitive Machines currently has meaningful liquidity after recent financing activity, but that support is balance-sheet-funded rather than earned through a self-sustaining cash engine, since operating cash flow and free cash flow remain negative. The company has bought itself time with roughly $583 million of cash and a restored positive equity balance, yet debt also rose materially and the underlying business still loses money at both the operating and net-income levels. The financial risk is therefore that investors may mistake runway for resilience: if contract execution or margin improvement does not arrive quickly enough, the company could return to a position where additional external capital becomes necessary before the business proves economic viability.
Intuitive Machines gets paid largely through government and institutional contracts that fund mission design, spacecraft production, payload delivery, network services and related operations, often through milestone payments and multi-year program structures. The economics improve when a capability built for one mission becomes reusable infrastructure, such as relay networks, navigation services or standard satellite buses that can support multiple customers. That makes the business model less like a traditional launch provider and more like a specialized space prime contractor trying to combine hardware, mission execution and service layers into a platform that can monetize the Moon-to-Mars architecture over time.
Intuitive Machines is evolving from a lunar-landing specialist into a broader space infrastructure contractor that builds spacecraft, connects communications and navigation networks, and operates mission and data services for civil, commercial and national-security customers. Its original identity was built around lunar access through Nova-class landers and NASA's CLPS program, but recent acquisitions and contract wins have expanded the company into satellite manufacturing, constellation support, deep-space navigation and cislunar communications. Management now frames the business around persistent space infrastructure rather than one-off lunar missions, which means investors are increasingly underwriting a prime-contractor model with a larger hardware, network and services footprint.
The cost structure is engineering- and manufacturing-intensive, with large program labor content, mission-specific procurement, spacecraft production, testing, launch-related spending, and facilities required for mission operations and systems integration. Gross margins can be volatile because individual contracts may carry different risk profiles, fixed-price commitments and schedule sensitivities, while launch delays, technical issues or design changes can shift cost recognition and estimated-at-completion assumptions. Recent vertical integration through Lanteris and internal satellite production should provide greater control over delivery and system integration over time, but it also raises the fixed-cost base and execution burden.
Barriers to entry are high because participants need systems engineering expertise, mission operations capability, regulatory compliance, launch integration experience, and the financial capacity to absorb technical setbacks and long procurement cycles. Flight heritage and customer trust are especially important because failures are costly and visible. Substitutes are limited for lunar delivery and cislunar relay services in the near term, but customers can still choose different architectures, defer mission plans, or consolidate awards among a handful of trusted providers if budgets tighten or programs are reprioritized.
Its main advantages come from flight heritage, mission execution experience, government customer credibility, and an increasingly integrated offering across delivery, data transmission, navigation, and spacecraft systems. In this industry, successful missions and validated operational capability create real differentiation because customers are buying against technical risk, schedule confidence, and mission assurance rather than price alone. The combination of lunar surface experience, Near Space Network participation, and acquired spacecraft and navigation capabilities gives Intuitive Machines a stronger platform than a single-product contractor, even though the moat remains early-stage and execution-dependent.
Competition comes from a small but growing field of commercial lunar and space systems providers, established aerospace primes, and specialized spacecraft, launch, and mission services companies. In lunar services, the competitive set is narrow because few companies can credibly bid for end-to-end delivery, operations, and infrastructure support under NASA's CLPS and related programs. As the company broadens into near-space network services, deep space navigation, and vertically integrated spacecraft manufacturing, it increasingly competes with larger incumbents as well as newer commercial entrants trying to secure roles in cislunar, national security, and deep-space architectures.
Capital structure composition and liquidity ratios
The balance sheet has improved dramatically in liquidity terms, but that improvement is heavily financing-driven rather than internally earned. Cash and short-term investments rose to roughly $583 million, current assets are far above current liabilities, and reported equity is now positive at about $204 million after being negative in earlier periods. That gives the company real runway today. The tradeoff is that debt also stepped up sharply to about $362 million, and the improved capital position has not yet been matched by self-funding operations. This is therefore a balance sheet with useful near-term support, but not one that proves the business is financially mature or de-risked.
Taken together, the balance sheet and cash-flow statement show a company with runway, but not self-funding resilience. The cash balance is currently large enough to support operations for a period of time, which materially lowers immediate financing pressure. But because free cash flow remains negative and debt increased sharply, that balance-sheet support comes from external capital rather than from an operating model that is already sustaining itself. In practical terms, liquidity buys time for execution, yet it does not by itself solve the business-model risk. The distinction matters here because downside support is financial rather than economic at this stage.
Operating, investing, and financing cash flow by period
Cash-flow quality remains weak. Operating cash flow is still negative at about $14 million on a trailing basis, capital spending added another roughly $42 million of outflow, and free cash flow was negative about $56 million. That is an improvement from the worse free-cash-flow levels of prior years, but it still means the business is consuming cash rather than producing owner earnings. The main reason the company can absorb that burn is not an inherently efficient operating model, but the large financing inflow that boosted liquidity. Until operating cash flow turns sustainably positive, the reported revenue scale should be treated as necessary but far from sufficient evidence of economic viability.
| Peer Set | EPS Growth | Company Name | Revenue Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| AVAV | AeroVironment, Inc. | 143.4% | |
| AXON | -98.0% | Axon Enterprise, Inc. | 38.5% |
| BA | Boeing Company (The) | 57.1% | |
| FLY |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | TTM | Dec 2025 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
•Total Revenue | 207,132 | 207,132 | 228,000 | 79,551 | 85,946 |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | Dec 2025 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
•Total Assets | 757,154 | 355,404 | 85,908 | 67,004 |
•Current Assets |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | TTM | Dec 2025 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
•Operating Cash Flow | -14,318 | -14,318 | -57,587 | -45,279 | 784 |
| Value | Shares | Holder Type | Shareholder | Date Reported | Percentage Out |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 255,224,234 | 10,068,017 | institutional | Blackrock Inc. | Dec 2025 | 6.29% |
| 155,577,413 | 6,137,176 | institutional | State Street Corporation | Dec 2025 | 3.84% |
| 153,660,903 | 6,061,574 | institutional | Vanguard Group Inc |
Environmental factors are material for Intuitive Machines because launch activity, spacecraft manufacturing, component sourcing and mission operations create exposure to hazardous materials handling, energy use, waste management and broader scrutiny around the environmental footprint of space infrastructure. Although the company is not a traditional high-emissions industrial operator, its growth into lunar access, orbital services, satellite communications and national security space programs increases the importance of disciplined environmental management across a technically complex supply chain. Environmental performance is also commercially relevant because government customers and sophisticated partners increasingly expect contractors to demonstrate sound stewardship, compliance and operational resilience. For Intuitive Machines, environmental issues are tied primarily to responsible manufacturing, supplier oversight and the credibility required to scale long-duration space infrastructure programs.
Intuitive Machines' ESG opportunity is that responsible execution, strong technical governance and trusted relationships with NASA, defense and commercial customers can position it as a credible long-term provider of lunar and in-space infrastructure. Its ESG risks include mission failure, program delays, safety incidents, supply chain weaknesses, cybersecurity breaches, regulatory non-compliance and governance strain as the company expands through acquisitions and more complex government work. Because the company's brand is closely linked to reliability and national strategic relevance, ESG performance directly influences award potential, financing flexibility and the durability of backlog conversion. The central ESG question for Intuitive Machines is whether it can grow into a scaled space prime contractor while preserving the control environment, engineering rigor and stakeholder trust required for sustainable performance.
Governance is highly material for Intuitive Machines because shareholder value depends on capital discipline, acquisition integration, contract execution, compliance and board oversight of a rapidly evolving space technology company operating with government and national security customers. The company's governance documents and code of conduct are important because Intuitive Machines must manage conflicts, insider information, procurement integrity, cyber and regulatory risks while balancing aggressive growth ambitions against cash flow, backlog realization and program execution realities. Governance quality also affects how management allocates capital across lunar missions, data relay, satellite platforms and acquisitions such as KinetX and Lanteris. For Intuitive Machines, strong governance determines whether strategic expansion translates into sustainable scale rather than operational overreach.
1Y cumulative return vs XUU
The market still appears to price LUNR with a heavy dose of mission-event risk and speculative lunar sentiment, but the local inputs suggest the business mix is broadening into a more conventional, if still early-stage, space infrastructure contractor model. That matters because satellite manufacturing, deep-space navigation, and network services can carry more durable follow-on potential than isolated lunar milestones. The shares are risky, but investors may be underestimating how much strategic value now depends on becoming a vertically integrated space systems and services provider rather than simply repeating lander missions.
The main risks are execution failures on technically demanding missions and spacecraft programs, dependence on U.S. government procurement timing, and the possibility that acquisitions increase complexity faster than they improve margins or backlog quality. The local analysis also shows very weak profitability and returns, so the company has little room for major schedule slips, cost overruns, or mission underperformance. If Intuitive Machines fails to convert its broader infrastructure vision into repeatable contract economics, the stock could remain a volatile, event-driven lunar name instead of rerating toward a more durable aerospace-and-defense contractor profile.
On March 19, 2026, Intuitive Machines reported fourth-quarter and full-year 2025 results that highlighted a transformational year for the company. Management emphasized the completion of its second lunar mission, expansion into national security programs, the completed KinetX acquisition, and the completed $800 million Lanteris acquisition in Q1 2026, while also pointing to a combined-company backlog of roughly $943 million at February month-end. Although current financials remain volatile and revenue in 2025 declined versus 2024, the release showed that the company is increasingly organizing itself around a larger prime-contractor opportunity set rather than a single-program lunar niche.
Speculative hold or only small, selective accumulation. Intuitive Machines has credible strategic upside if it successfully scales into a broader space prime, but the financial profile is still too early and volatile for a standard core position. Exposure should be sized for program, schedule, and financing risk rather than for smooth compounding.
Valuation is difficult to anchor on traditional profitability because the company remains loss-making and margin profile is well below peer medians. That means the equity is being valued more on strategic backlog, program wins, and platform potential than on near-term earnings power. Investors should treat the stock less like a mature aerospace contractor and more like an execution-heavy infrastructure buildout with substantial upside only if backlog and newly acquired capabilities convert into materially better margins over time.
Street
bearMarket-Implied
bullMost Likely
bearConfidence
MediumStreet expectations most closely align with the bear case because LUNR trades above both mean and median targets, has very high target dispersion, and carries a premium-stretched valuation signal despite still-weak current fundamentals. Analysts may like the strategic opportunity, but the local street anchor does not support fresh upside at the current quote. The street case is effectively saying the market has already capitalized more of the future infrastructure story than current operating proof can justify.
The market-implied case is bull because the stock is being valued on a future success case rather than present financial quality. Current revenue is volatile, margins are deeply negative, operating cash flow and free cash flow remain negative, and valuation multiples are rich, yet the equity trades above consensus. That means investors are assuming backlog conversion, acquisition integration, network services, spacecraft manufacturing, and national-security opportunities will mature into a much stronger and more durable space infrastructure platform.
The overall most likely case is bear because the strategic upside is real but the current price gives too much credit before the business has demonstrated durable economics. Liquidity has improved and the broader prime-contractor opportunity is interesting, but cash burn, negative margins, financing dependence, execution risk, and mission-event volatility remain material. With the stock already above the local street anchor, the most likely risk-reward outcome is that management must exceed elevated expectations simply to defend the current valuation.
Confidence is medium because the valuation and financial inputs strongly argue for caution, but the company has meaningful strategic optionality, improved liquidity, acquisition-expanded capabilities, and government-backed backlog that could change the case if margins and cash flow improve materially.
Bear Case
In the bear case, Intuitive Machines remains an exciting space infrastructure story but fails to mature quickly enough to justify a valuation above consensus. Backlog conversion is uneven, mission timing stays volatile, acquisitions add complexity, and network or services revenue remains too small to offset hardware and program execution risk. Operating losses and negative free cash flow persist, forcing investors to treat the current cash balance as runway rather than proof of resilience. The stock then trades down because it was already priced for a future prime-contractor success case before the economics were validated.
What Must Go Right: To avoid the bear case, LUNR must convert backlog into reported revenue with better gross margins, execute technically demanding missions without major setbacks, and integrate KinetX and Lanteris into a coherent platform. The February 2026 strategic investment in communications and in-space data processing needs to produce durable, higher-margin services revenue rather than simply adding another capital-intensive ambition. Operating cash flow also needs to move toward sustainable positivity before investors can underwrite the company as more than a speculative program-driven asset.
What Must Go Wrong: The bear case takes hold if mission execution slips, government procurement timing delays awards, cost overruns pressure margins, acquisitions fail to improve contract economics, or cash burn continues despite a larger revenue base. It also becomes more likely if additional financing is needed before the business proves repeatable economic viability, since that would confirm that runway improved faster than business quality.
Base Case
In the base case, Intuitive Machines uses its improved liquidity and expanded capabilities to keep building toward a broader space infrastructure contractor model, but the financial transition remains slow. Revenue and backlog demonstrate commercial relevance, national-security and lunar programs sustain strategic visibility, and the company avoids a near-term financing crisis. However, margins, cash conversion, and operating leverage remain too weak to justify treating the stock like an established aerospace platform. The result is a volatile hold rather than a clean long at the current price.
The current valuation assumes the company’s heavy reinvestment phase will lead to a durable infrastructure platform rather than to recurring dilution and disappointing returns. There is some basis for that view because the balance sheet now has real liquidity, management is funding communications and data-processing ambitions, and the acquired platforms could broaden the revenue base beyond isolated lunar missions. The problem is that reinvestment is still being financed externally rather than from internally generated cash, with free cash flow around negative $56 million and operating cash flow still negative. That means the market is effectively assuming that today’s cash burn is strategic rather than structural, and that the present cash runway is enough to bridge to better economics. That may prove right, but it is a demanding assumption when current margins and cash conversion remain weak. For a PM, the implication is that reinvestment is not the issue in theory, but the stock already gives management credit for spending as if the payoff were much more certain than the numbers show.
Implied Discount Rate
11.74%
This data is not included in the public sample.
This business should carry a high discount rate because execution risk, customer concentration, technical complexity, and financing dependence are all materially elevated. The improved cash balance lowers immediate survival risk, but it does not turn Intuitive Machines into a low-risk contractor, since debt has also climbed and the operating model still lacks self-funding resilience. Program timing, government procurement risk, integration complexity, and the possibility of mission setbacks all argue for a wide risk premium even if the strategic vision is compelling. In other words, the right framework is not to discount future cash flows like those of an established aerospace prime, but like those of an early-stage infrastructure builder with real optionality and real failure risk. The current market posture appears more forgiving than that discipline would imply, which is why the valuation feels stretched relative to today’s fundamentals. For underwriting fresh capital, a conservative discount rate remains essential because liquidity has improved faster than business quality has.
The long-run value being implied here is that Intuitive Machines becomes a persistent space infrastructure platform with a defensible role in lunar access, communications, navigation, spacecraft manufacturing, and national-security adjacent programs. That outcome is possible, and the strategic logic has strengthened with KinetX, Lanteris, and the company’s broader network ambitions. The problem is that terminal durability is still almost entirely aspirational from a financial perspective, because current economics do not yet show that the company can convert technological relevance into repeatable returns. A real terminal-value case would require evidence that services and platform revenues become more durable, margin-accretive, and less mission-event dependent over time. Until that evidence exists, the market is valuing a future franchise before the durability of that franchise has been demonstrated. For a long-horizon investor, the terminal story is intriguing, but today it deserves to be treated as optionality rather than as a solid floor under the stock.
Subject percentile rank vs peer set
Peer pricing undermines the current quote more than it supports it. LUNR trades at roughly 24.5x EV/revenue and about 20.9x sales despite margins, returns, and revenue growth that sit well below peer medians and despite the lack of usable earnings-based valuation support. That multiple can only be defended by assuming a much stronger future than the one reflected in present-day financial quality, and that is exactly the risk for new buyers. Established aerospace names with positive margins trade far lower, while even space-adjacent growth peers usually pair rich multiples with cleaner top-line momentum or more developed unit economics. In that sense, the stock is not being valued as a current business at all, but as a future success case. For fresh capital, comparables say the market has already extended premium treatment before the company has earned it financially.
At the current price, LUNR already discounts a favorable strategic future that assumes backlog conversion, acquisition integration, and network ambitions will mature into a much stronger economic model than the company currently shows. The stock requires material improvement in revenue execution, gross margin, and cash conversion to justify trading above consensus while still posting deeply negative profitability metrics. The strategic upside is real, but the present valuation gives little margin of safety if mission timing slips, new capabilities scale slowly, or externally funded runway proves less valuable than expected. For new capital, this is not the kind of setup where the market is waiting to discover the story; it is already paying up for it. Pass.
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Convergence here means the stock sustaining or extending today’s premium valuation by delivering operating evidence strong enough to support a price already above the local street anchor. The path to upside realization is narrow but clear: management would need to convert backlog into cleaner reported revenue, show that acquisitions are improving the business mix, and produce much better margin and cash-flow outcomes so the market can justify valuing LUNR as an emerging prime rather than a speculative lunar contractor. That outcome is possible, but it is not especially likely from current levels because the shares already reflect a generous future-case multiple while the present financial profile remains weak, volatile, and financing-dependent. In other words, the market has already rerated the vision faster than the business has matured, which lowers the probability of further convergence from here. The single most important datapoint that would change this score is sustained positive operating cash flow alongside evidence that higher-margin services and network revenues are becoming a meaningful share of total revenue.
The commercial lunar and cislunar infrastructure market has strong long-term promise but remains early, episodic, and heavily shaped by a small number of government customers, which creates structural volatility even when the narrative around space spending is favorable. Intuitive Machines faces competition from both newer commercial entrants and larger aerospace primes that can pursue the same lunar, network, and national-security opportunities with deeper capital, supply-chain scale, and procurement experience. The industry is also vulnerable to budget changes, milestone delays, and architecture shifts that can postpone or consolidate demand, so a company pricing itself to future infrastructure relevance can still face sharp setbacks if the market matures more slowly than expected.
The company operates under intense procurement, export-control, cybersecurity, mission-assurance, and launch-safety requirements across NASA, defense, and adjacent national-security work, so regulatory and compliance failures could threaten both current programs and future eligibility for sensitive awards. Because Intuitive Machines is moving into communications, navigation, spacecraft manufacturing, and broader infrastructure services, the compliance burden is expanding at the same time operational complexity is increasing. A contract protest, export-control issue, mission-assurance failure, or quality-system lapse would likely have consequences well beyond a single program because customer trust and government credibility are core assets for a business still establishing itself as a prime contractor.
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The bullish case for Intuitive Machines depends on the market believing that early lunar access and recent contract momentum are the foundation of a broader, durable space infrastructure franchise rather than a collection of promising but still experimental revenue streams. That thesis breaks if the company cannot translate mission visibility into repeatable, higher-margin network and spacecraft services, because in that scenario today's valuation would still be tied to a future platform that has not yet been economically proven. If mission execution remains volatile, cash burn persists, or larger competitors capture the most attractive layers of cislunar infrastructure, the stock is likely to remain a speculative program-driven asset rather than compounding into a high-confidence aerospace platform.
Go-to-market is a direct, technical, procurement-driven sales process centered on NASA, defense agencies, prime contractors and sophisticated commercial space customers. Success depends on winning competitive bids, demonstrating flight heritage, integrating with customer mission requirements, and maintaining credibility as both a mission operator and systems manufacturer. The company also relies on ecosystem relationships, including launch providers, subcontractors, institutional partners and acquired technical teams, because many awards require it to present a complete mission or network solution rather than a standalone component.
Operations are anchored in the United States, especially around NASA, U.S. civil-space programs, national-security customers and the Houston Spaceport manufacturing and mission-operations footprint. Revenue concentration is therefore tied more to U.S. government budget priorities and procurement cycles than to broad geographic consumer demand, although the acquired satellite-manufacturing heritage and commercial-space customer set extend relevance to global operators. Geographic risk shows up less through retail end-market exposure and more through government funding dynamics, export-control constraints, supply-chain access and the ability to serve international or allied missions within U.S. regulatory limits.
Management's main levers are contract selection, technical execution, vertical integration, backlog conversion and the pace at which it expands from single-mission work into repeatable network and infrastructure services. Winning higher-value prime contracts in national security space, scaling satellite manufacturing efficiently, and using lunar missions to seed communications, navigation and data-relay demand are the clearest ways to improve margins and growth durability. Capital allocation around acquisitions, production capacity and communications-network investment also matters because the company is trying to move up the value chain from niche lunar delivery toward a broader space-systems prime-contractor role.
The portfolio now includes lunar delivery missions, lunar and near-space communications and navigation services, satellite and spacecraft platforms, mission operations, hosted payload services, avionics, propulsion, orbital-transfer capabilities and deep-space navigation software and services. Historically the company organized offerings around lunar access, orbital services, lunar data services, and space products and infrastructure; after the Lanteris acquisition, spacecraft manufacturing became much more central, with 300-, 500- and 1300-series satellite platforms and broader national-security and commercial satellite exposure. KinetX adds flight dynamics and constellation-management capability, while Near Space Network Services positions Intuitive Machines to sell communications relay and navigation capacity rather than only mission hardware.
The operating environment is shaped by federal procurement rules, mission assurance requirements, launch and range coordination, export controls, security clearances, and the intense technical oversight that comes with NASA and defense work. Program timing and cash flow are exposed to continuing resolutions, changing agency priorities and contract protest risk, while mission failures or performance shortfalls can damage both near-term economics and future award prospects. Because Intuitive Machines is handling spacecraft, propulsion, communications infrastructure and national-security adjacent work, compliance demands span ITAR/export regimes, cybersecurity, quality systems, hazardous materials handling and flight-safety disciplines.
Revenue is driven by milestone-based government contracts, backlog conversion on awarded programs, mission execution and follow-on hardware or network awards rather than recurring consumer demand. Near-term sales depend heavily on NASA programs such as CLPS, NSNS and lunar surface initiatives, plus defense and national-security opportunities tied to satellite platforms, missile tracking and orbital-transfer missions. The mix can swing materially based on the timing of mission launches, customer acceptance milestones, satellite manufacturing schedules, and whether Intuitive Machines converts its installed lunar and cislunar capabilities into longer-duration data, navigation and mission-operations revenue streams.
Intuitive Machines operates in the emerging space infrastructure and lunar services market, spanning lunar delivery, cislunar communications and navigation, spacecraft manufacturing, and mission services for civil, national security, and commercial customers. This industry sits between traditional government-led space programs and newer commercial space models, with companies selling transportation, data relay, navigation, and in-space infrastructure as services rather than only building one-off hardware. The market is still early, heavily program-driven, and shaped by a small set of technically demanding customers, especially NASA and U.S. government agencies.
The sector has strong secular tailwinds from Artemis-related lunar activity, commercial lunar services programs, national security space demand, and rising interest in communications and data infrastructure beyond Earth orbit. Growth can be very uneven because revenue depends on mission awards, contract timing, launch schedules, technical milestones, and the pace at which government customers transition from demonstrations to repeat operational procurements. For Intuitive Machines, this means backlog and addressable market can expand quickly on major awards, but quarterly results can still be volatile due to milestone-based accounting, launch slips, and the inherently episodic nature of mission execution.
The industry is exposed to government funding priorities, procurement rules, export controls, licensing requirements, launch and spectrum regulation, mission assurance standards, and the political direction of U.S. civil and defense space programs. Structural risks are unusually high because a single mission failure, program delay, or contract loss can materially affect credibility and financial performance. For Intuitive Machines, the central long-term risk is whether it can convert early lunar and near-space leadership into a durable, diversified infrastructure franchise before larger primes or competing commercial providers capture the most attractive layers of the market.
Pricing power is limited by competitive procurements and government budget discipline, but it can improve when a company offers capabilities that are scarce, mission critical, or already flight validated. Cost position is difficult because lunar and deep-space systems require heavy engineering investment, rigorous testing, specialized supply chains, and significant fixed overhead before scale benefits fully emerge. Margins therefore depend less on commodity cost control and more on contract selection, execution discipline, milestone achievement, utilization of engineering resources, and the ability to shift mix toward higher-margin infrastructure and service revenue over time.
Customers are concentrated and mostly institutional, led by NASA, defense-related agencies, and other government or commercial space entities seeking lunar access, communications, navigation, or spacecraft platforms. That concentration gives buyers meaningful leverage, but it also creates long-duration relationships when a provider becomes embedded in mission architectures or network plans. Suppliers include launch providers, specialized component manufacturers, avionics and propulsion vendors, software and ground systems partners, and highly skilled engineering labor, making supplier coordination and technical reliability central to delivery risk.
Normalized cash conversion and accrual quality metrics
Cash Conversion
0.18x
Risk
Accrual Intensity
-75.2%
Good
Earnings Margin
-92.1%
Risk
OCF Margin
-16.8%
Risk
Cash Conversion
0.18x
Accrual Intensity
-75.2%
Earnings Margin
-92.1%
OCF Margin
-16.8%
Revenue
$43.3K
Net Income
-$39.9K
Operating CF
-$7.3K
Reported earnings should be interpreted cautiously because the company is still far from a normalized earnings base and special items have been meaningful. The local statements include sizeable special-charge noise, including about $35 million on a trailing basis and much larger adjustments in prior periods, which makes simple net-income comparisons less useful. More importantly, the persistent gap between the revenue story and the lack of positive operating cash flow suggests the core economics are not yet validated by cash conversion. This is not a case where accrual accounting is hiding a strong underlying cash business; instead, both earnings and cash flow remain weak, just with some headline distortion layered on top. The safest read is that the company is still in a prove-it phase.
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Earnings history visual unavailable for this report.
The forward outlook is highly conditional. For the financial picture to improve meaningfully, the company needs not just more contract revenue, but a material improvement in gross margin, operating discipline, and operating cash conversion. The current cash balance gives management time to pursue that path, which is important. But because the business is still loss-making and free-cash-flow negative, the next step in the story has to be operational proof rather than another simple increase in funded runway. If execution improves, the upside could be meaningful because the market is already underwriting a large future opportunity. If it does not, today's valuation leaves very little support from present-day fundamentals.
The multi-year record is best framed as early commercialization with heavy volatility rather than as a normal scaled growth story. Revenue increased meaningfully from the low base of 2022 and 2023, but profitability never became stable and cash generation remains negative. Gross margin has swung from positive to negative and back to barely positive, while operating losses have stayed substantial across the whole period. At the same time, the balance sheet is much less stressed today than it was previously because capital raising and borrowing materially changed the funding picture. The broader history therefore says the company has made progress in access to capital and contract activity, but not yet in proving repeatable economic quality.
Revenue (USD) and profitability margins (% of revenue)
Intuitive Machines still has an early-stage and highly volatile income statement. Revenue is far above the 2023 and 2022 base, reaching roughly $207 million on a trailing basis, which confirms the company has moved beyond a purely pre-revenue phase. But that scale has not translated into operating economics yet: gross profit is only about $6 million, operating loss is roughly $87 million, and net loss is about $84 million. The latest period is actually weaker on revenue than the 2025 annual figure, so the recent top-line trend is not simply a straight line upward. The underwriting conclusion is that the company has demonstrated commercial activity, but not a durable earnings model, and the current cost structure still overwhelms the revenue base.
The ratio set is weak fundamentally and demanding on valuation. Gross margin, operating margin, net margin, return on equity, and return on assets are all far below peer medians, while revenue growth is also below the peer median and currently negative against the latest annual comparison. Despite that, the stock trades at very rich multiples on the measures that can be observed: EV-to-revenue and price-to-sales are far above peer medians, forward P/E is extremely high, and trailing P/E and EV-to-EBITDA are not usable because profitability is not there. Price-to-book is also not decision-useful because capital structure and still-immature economics distort the signal. The investment implication is that the market is pricing a future success case, not a current-quality business.
The durable trend that can be underwritten most confidently is that the company now has more access to capital and a larger revenue base than it did several years ago. The trends that should not be over-extrapolated are profitability and cash generation, because both remain weak and highly sensitive to timing, contract mix, and non-recurring charges. The latest revenue level also should not be blindly annualized as though it guarantees continued scaling, since the trailing figure already sits below the latest annual revenue level. Investors can reasonably assume the company has bought itself time and commercial relevance; they should not assume it has already proven a durable economic model.
| Firefly Aerospace Inc. |
| 538.4% |
| GD | 0.4% | General Dynamics Corporation | 7.8% |
| GE | 37.4% | GE Aerospace | 17.6% |
| HWM | 20.3% | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 14.6% |
| KTOS | 18.6% | Kratos Defense & Security Solut | 21.9% |
| LHX | -6.1% | L3Harris Technologies, Inc. | 190.0% |
| LMT | 161.0% | Lockheed Martin Corporation | 9.1% |
| NOC | 15.2% | Northrop Grumman Corporation | 9.6% |
| PL | Planet Labs PBC | 41.1% |
| RDW | Redwire Corporation | 56.4% |
| RKLB | Rocket Lab Corporation | 35.7% |
| RTX | 8.3% | RTX Corporation | 12.1% |
| TDG | -12.9% | Transdigm Group Incorporated | 13.9% |
| WWD | 52.8% | Woodward, Inc. | 29.0% |
| -98.0% | Peer Low | 7.8% |
| 17.9% | Peer Mean | 72.7% |
| 15.2% | Peer Median | 29.0% |
| 161.0% | Peer High | 538.4% |
| Subject (LUNR) | -18.1% |
| ROA | ROE | Peer Set | Net Margin | Company Name | Gross Margin | Operating Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -1.3% | -8.7% | AVAV | -13.9% | AeroVironment, Inc. | 25.0% | -5.1% |
| -0.3% | 4.5% | AXON | 4.5% | Axon Enterprise, Inc. | 59.8% | -3.1% |
| -2.0% | 290.1% | BA | 2.5% | Boeing Company (The) | 4.8% | -3.2% |
| -12.4% | -56.5% | FLY | -208.9% | Firefly Aerospace Inc. | 19.2% | -98.2% |
| 6.0% | 17.7% | GD | 8.0% | General Dynamics Corporation | 15.1% | 10.1% |
| 4.7% | 44.7% | GE | 19.0% | GE Aerospace | 31.5% | 19.5% |
| 12.1% | 30.4% | HWM | 18.3% | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 34.2% | 26.3% |
| 0.8% | 1.3% | KTOS | 1.6% | Kratos Defense & Security Solut | 22.9% | 2.9% |
| LHX | 10.4% | L3Harris Technologies, Inc. | 30.4% | 9.7% | ||
| 7.6% | 76.9% | LMT | 6.7% | Lockheed Martin Corporation | 10.2% | 9.0% |
| 6.6% | 26.2% | NOC | 10.0% | Northrop Grumman Corporation | 19.8% | 16.5% |
| -5.9% | -78.4% | PL | -80.2% | Planet Labs PBC | 56.2% | -30.4% |
| -11.5% | -41.8% | RDW | -67.6% | Redwire Corporation | 9.2% | -43.0% |
| -8.2% | -18.8% | RKLB | -32.9% | Rocket Lab Corporation | 34.4% | -28.4% |
| 3.9% | 11.0% | RTX | 7.6% | RTX Corporation | 20.1% | 11.0% |
| 11.8% | TDG | 22.2% | Transdigm Group Incorporated | 59.7% | 45.6% | |
| 7.8% | 20.4% | WWD | 12.9% | Woodward, Inc. | 28.1% | 16.1% |
| -12.4% | -78.4% | -208.9% | Peer Low | 4.8% | -98.2% | |
| 1.2% | 21.3% | -16.5% | Peer Mean | 28.3% | -2.6% | |
| 2.3% | 11.0% | 6.7% | Peer Median | 25.0% | 9.0% | |
| 12.1% | 290.1% | 22.2% | Peer High | 59.8% | 45.6% | |
| -9.8% | -102.9% | -39.7% | Subject (LUNR) | 4.3% | -73.9% |
| P/B | P/E | P/S | Peer Set | EV/EBITDA | EV/Revenue | Market Cap | Forward P/E | Company Name | Enterprise Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.23 | 6.02 | AVAV | 64.53x | 6.06x | $9.7bn | 47.26 | AeroVironment, Inc. | $9.8bn | |
| 9.97 | 11.68 | AXON | 11.69x | $32.5bn | 38.12 | Axon Enterprise, Inc. | $32.5bn | ||
| 32.17 | 90.07 | 1.96 | BA | 2.27x | $175.5bn | 51.08 | Boeing Company (The) | $203.1bn | |
| 5.85 | 43.75 | FLY | 40.09x | $7.0bn | Firefly Aerospace Inc. | $6.4bn | |||
| 3.54 | 21.78 | 1.73 | GD | 15.49x | 1.87x | $91.1bn | 18.71 | General Dynamics Corporation | $98.2bn |
| 17.08 | 37.73 | 7.00 | GE | 30.72x | 7.17x | $320.8bn | 35.26 | GE Aerospace | $328.8bn |
| 19.18 | 68.92 | 12.42 | HWM | 43.97x | 12.72x | $102.5bn | 45.38 | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | $105.0bn |
| 6.01 | 9.87 | KTOS | 8.67x | $13.3bn | 65.99 | Kratos Defense & Security Solut | $11.7bn | ||
| 3.41 | 41.17 | 5.09 | LHX | 39.39x | 6.58x | $65.4bn | 25.77 | L3Harris Technologies, Inc. | $84.5bn |
| 20.18 | 27.54 | 1.82 | LMT | 18.70x | 2.06x | $136.5bn | 18.50 | Lockheed Martin Corporation | $154.9bn |
| 5.67 | 22.88 | 2.25 | NOC | 15.82x | 2.57x | $94.5bn | 22.04 | Northrop Grumman Corporation | $107.9bn |
| 68.47 | 43.28 | PL | 42.71x | $13.3bn | Planet Labs PBC | $13.1bn | |||
| 1.86 | 6.13 | RDW | 6.20x | $2.1bn | Redwire Corporation | $2.1bn | |||
| 26.77 | 81.45 | RKLB | 78.71x | $49.0bn | Rocket Lab Corporation | $47.4bn | |||
| 4.04 | 39.52 | 2.98 | RTX | 20.23x | 3.36x | $264.4bn | 26.07 | RTX Corporation | $298.1bn |
| -7.70 | 40.65 | 7.85 | TDG | 21.32x | 10.87x | $71.5bn | 27.54 | Transdigm Group Incorporated | $99.0bn |
| 9.12 | 49.79 | 6.25 | WWD | 35.53x | 6.34x | $23.7bn | 38.32 | Woodward, Inc. | $24.0bn |
| 1.86 | 21.78 | 1.73 | 15.49x | 1.87x | $2.1bn | 18.50 | Peer Low | $2.1bn | |
| 14.72 | 44.01 | 14.80 | 24.65x | 14.70x | $86.6bn | 35.39 | Peer Mean | $95.7bn | |
| 7.56 | 40.09 | 6.25 | 20.77x | 6.58x | $65.4bn | 35.26 | Peer Median | $84.5bn | |
| 68.47 | 90.07 | 81.45 | 39.39x | 78.71x | $320.8bn | 65.99 | Peer High | $328.8bn | |
| -4.43 | 20.93 | 24.49x | $4.4bn | 128.28 | Subject (LUNR) | $5.1bn |
| 207,132 |
| 207,132 |
| 228,000 |
| 79,551 |
| 85,946 |
Cost of Revenue | 201,069 | 201,069 | 225,231 | 103,993 | 75,513 |
Gross Profit | 6,063 | 6,063 | 2,769 | -24,442 | 10,433 |
•Operating Expense | 93,294 | 93,294 | 55,121 | 35,713 | 15,940 |
•Selling General and Administrative | 92,624 | 92,624 | 53,262 | 34,337 | 14,868 |
•General & Administrative Expense | 92,624 | 92,624 | 53,262 | 34,337 | 14,868 |
Other G and A | 92,624 | 92,624 | 53,262 | 34,337 | 14,868 |
•Depreciation Amortization Depletion | 3,597 | 3,597 | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
•Depreciation & amortization | 3,597 | 3,597 | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
Depreciation | 956 | -- | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
Other Operating Expenses | -2,927 | -2,927 | -- | -- | -- |
Operating Income | -87,231 | -87,231 | -52,352 | -60,155 | -5,507 |
•Net Non Operating Interest Income Expense | 11,095 | 11,095 | 180 | -823 | -836 |
Interest Income Non Operating | 15,272 | 15,272 | 272 | -- | -- |
Interest Expense Non Operating | 4,177 | 4,177 | 92 | 823 | 836 |
Total Other Finance Cost | -- | -- | -180 | 823 | -- |
•Other Income Expense | -26,748 | -26,748 | -294,713 | 71,158 | -85 |
Gain on Sale of Security | 8,384 | 8,384 | -77,651 | 13,082 | -91 |
•Special Income Charges | -35,223 | -35,223 | -125,168 | 65,288 | 0 |
Restructuring & Mergers Acquisition | 35,223 | 35,223 | 120,124 | -66,252 | 0 |
Impairment of Capital Assets | 0 | 0 | 5,044 | 964 | 0 |
Other Non Operating Income Expenses | 91 | 91 | -91,894 | -7,212 | 6 |
Pretax Income | -102,884 | -102,884 | -346,885 | 10,180 | -6,428 |
Tax Provision | 3,962 | 3,962 | 37 | 40 | -23 |
•Net Income Common Stockholders | -83,910 | -83,910 | -284,309 | 59,419 | 0 |
•Net Income | -83,294 | -83,294 | -283,413 | 61,762 | 0 |
•Net Income Including Non-Controlling Interests | -106,846 | -106,846 | -346,922 | 16,621 | 0 |
Net Income Continuous Operations | -106,846 | -106,846 | -346,922 | 10,140 | -6,405 |
Net Income Extraordinary | -- | -- | 0 | 6,481 | 6,405 |
Minority Interests | 23,552 | 23,552 | 63,509 | 45,141 | 0 |
Preferred Stock Dividends | 616 | 616 | 896 | 2,343 | -- |
Diluted NI Available to Com Stockholders | -83,910 | -83,910 | -284,309 | 59,419 | 0 |
Basic EPS | -0.73 | -- | -2.83 | 2.88 | 0.00 |
Diluted EPS | -0.73 | -- | -2.83 | 2.88 | 0.00 |
Basic Average Shares | 115,426.62 | -- | 100,609 | 21,029.88 | 18,070.27 |
Diluted Average Shares | 115,426.62 | -- | 100,609 | 21,029.88 | 18,070.27 |
Total Operating Income as Reported | -87,231 | -87,231 | -57,396 | -61,119 | -5,507 |
Total Expenses | 294,363 | 294,363 | 280,352 | 139,706 | 91,453 |
Net Income from Continuing & Discontinued Operation | -83,294 | -83,294 | -283,413 | 55,281 | -6,405 |
Normalized Income | -62,091.19 | -62,091.19 | -123,185.99 | -22,783.36 | -6,314.33 |
Interest Income | 15,272 | 15,272 | 272 | -- | -- |
Interest Expense | 4,177 | 4,177 | 92 | 823 | 836 |
Net Interest Income | 11,095 | 11,095 | 180 | -823 | -836 |
EBIT | -98,707 | -98,707 | -346,793 | -60,155 | -5,592 |
EBITDA | -95,110 | -95,110 | -344,934 | -58,779 | -4,520 |
Reconciled Cost of Revenue | 201,069 | 201,069 | 225,231 | 103,993 | 75,513 |
Reconciled Depreciation | 3,597 | 3,597 | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
Net Income from Continuing Operation Net Minority Interest | -83,294 | -83,294 | -283,413 | 55,281 | -6,405 |
Total Unusual Items Excluding Goodwill | -26,839 | -26,839 | -202,819 | 78,370 | -91 |
Total Unusual Items | -26,839 | -26,839 | -202,819 | 78,370 | -91 |
Normalized EBITDA | -68,271 | -68,271 | -142,115 | -137,149 | -4,429 |
Tax Rate for Calcs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Tax Effect of Unusual Items | -5,636.19 | -5,636.19 | -42,591.99 | 305.64 | -0.33 |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | TTM | Dec 2025 | Sep 2025 | Jun 2025 | Mar 2025 | Dec 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
•Total Revenue | 207,132 | 43,308 | 50,987 | 50,313 | 62,524 | 54,662 |
Operating Revenue | 207,132 | 43,308 | 50,987 | 50,313 | 62,524 | 54,662 |
Cost of Revenue | 201,069 | 36,297 | 46,769 | 62,156 | 55,847 | 53,983 |
Gross Profit | 6,063 | 7,011 | 4,218 | -11,843 | 6,677 | 679 |
•Operating Expense | 93,294 | 40,106 | 19,637 | 16,797 | 16,754 | 14,076 |
•Selling General and Administrative | 92,624 | 40,176 | 20,272 | 16,045 | 16,131 | 13,536 |
•General & Administrative Expense | 92,624 | 40,176 | 20,272 | 16,045 | 16,131 | 13,536 |
Other G and A | 92,624 | 40,176 | 20,272 | 16,045 | 16,131 | 13,536 |
•Depreciation Amortization Depletion | 3,597 | 1,407 | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
•Depreciation & amortization | 3,597 | 1,407 | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
Depreciation | 956 | -- | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
Other Operating Expenses | -2,927 | -1,477 | -1,450 | -- | -- | -- |
Operating Income | -87,231 | -33,095 | -15,419 | -28,640 | -10,077 | -13,397 |
•Net Non Operating Interest Income Expense | 11,095 | 2,785 | 3,489 | 3,428 | 1,393 | 149 |
Interest Income Non Operating | 15,272 | 5,520 | 4,833 | 3,428 | -- | -- |
Interest Expense Non Operating | 4,177 | 2,735 | 1,344 | -- | -- | -- |
Total Other Finance Cost | -- | -- | -- | -- | -1,393 | -- |
•Other Income Expense | -26,748 | -25,388 | 1,975 | -12,994 | 9,659 | -151,900 |
Gain on Sale of Security | 8,384 | -23,535 | 1,950 | -13,033 | 43,002 | -41,010 |
•Special Income Charges | -35,223 | -1,854 | 0 | 0 | -33,369 | -86,308 |
Restructuring & Mergers Acquisition | 35,223 | 1,854 | 0 | 0 | 33,369 | 86,308 |
Impairment of Capital Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | -- | -- | 0 |
Other Non Operating Income Expenses | 91 | 1 | 25 | 39 | 26 | -24,582 |
Pretax Income | -102,884 | -55,698 | -9,955 | -38,206 | 975 | -165,148 |
Tax Provision | 3,962 | 3,957 | 5 | 0 | 0 | -13 |
•Net Income Common Stockholders | -83,910 | -40,035 | -7,000 | -25,332 | -11,543 | -149,343 |
•Net Income | -83,294 | -39,875 | -6,842 | -25,181 | -11,396 | -149,198 |
•Net Income Including Non-Controlling Interests | -106,846 | -59,655 | -9,960 | -38,206 | 975 | -165,135 |
Net Income Continuous Operations | -106,846 | -59,655 | -9,960 | -38,206 | 975 | -165,135 |
Net Income Extraordinary | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Minority Interests | 23,552 | 19,780 | 3,118 | 13,025 | -12,371 | 15,937 |
Preferred Stock Dividends | 616 | 160 | 158 | 151 | 147 | 145 |
Diluted NI Available to Com Stockholders | -83,910 | -40,035 | -7,000 | -25,332 | -11,543 | -149,343 |
Basic EPS | -0.73 | -0.33 | -0.06 | -0.22 | -0.11 | -1.48 |
Diluted EPS | -0.73 | -0.33 | -0.06 | -0.22 | -0.11 | -1.48 |
Basic Average Shares | 115,426.62 | 121,281.88 | 117,815.86 | 117,434.78 | 107,081.92 | 100,609 |
Diluted Average Shares | 115,426.62 | 121,281.88 | 117,815.86 | 117,434.78 | 107,081.92 | 100,609 |
Total Operating Income as Reported | -87,231 | -33,095 | -15,419 | -28,640 | -10,077 | -13,397 |
Total Expenses | 294,363 | 76,403 | 66,406 | 78,953 | 72,601 | 68,059 |
Net Income from Continuing & Discontinued Operation | -83,294 | -39,875 | -6,842 | -25,181 | -11,396 | -149,198 |
Normalized Income | -62,091.19 | -19,817.69 | -8,382.50 | -12,148 | -21,029 | -21,890.02 |
Interest Income | 15,272 | 5,520 | 4,833 | 3,428 | -- | -- |
Interest Expense | 4,177 | 2,735 | 1,344 | -- | -- | -- |
Net Interest Income | 11,095 | 2,785 | 3,489 | 3,428 | 1,393 | 149 |
EBIT | -98,707 | -52,963 | -8,611 | -28,640 | -10,077 | -13,397 |
EBITDA | -95,110 | -51,556 | -7,796 | -27,888 | -9,454 | -12,857 |
Reconciled Cost of Revenue | 201,069 | 36,297 | 46,769 | 62,156 | 55,847 | 53,983 |
Reconciled Depreciation | 3,597 | 1,407 | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
Net Income from Continuing Operation Net Minority Interest | -83,294 | -39,875 | -6,842 | -25,181 | -11,396 | -149,198 |
Total Unusual Items Excluding Goodwill | -26,839 | -25,389 | 1,950 | -13,033 | 9,633 | -127,318 |
Total Unusual Items | -26,839 | -25,389 | 1,950 | -13,033 | 9,633 | -127,318 |
Normalized EBITDA | -68,271 | -26,167 | -9,746 | -14,855 | -19,087 | 114,461 |
Tax Rate for Calcs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Tax Effect of Unusual Items | -5,636.19 | -5,331.69 | 409.50 | 0 | 0 | -10.02 |
| 618,814 |
| 293,161 |
| 31,611 |
| 40,992 |
•Cash, Cash Equivalents & Short Term Investments | 582,606 | 207,607 | 4,498 | 25,764 |
Cash And Cash Equivalents | 582,606 | 207,607 | 4,498 | 25,764 |
•Receivables | 24,421 | 62,872 | 23,027 | 1,649 |
•Accounts receivable | 12,193 | 44,759 | 16,881 | 1,302 |
Gross Accounts Receivable | -- | -- | 16,881 | 2,138 |
Allowance For Doubtful Accounts Receivable | -- | -- | 0 | -836 |
Other Receivables | 12,228 | 18,113 | 6,146 | 347 |
Restricted Cash | 2,733 | 2,042 | 62 | 62 |
Current Deferred Assets | 8 | 16,479 | 980 | 6,633 |
Other Current Assets | 9,046 | 4,161 | 3,044 | 6,884 |
•Total non-current assets | 138,340 | 62,243 | 54,297 | 26,012 |
•Net PPE | 105,399 | 62,243 | 54,297 | 26,005 |
•Gross PPE | 112,955 | 66,753 | 57,174 | 28,927 |
Properties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Machinery Furniture Equipment | 20,806 | 10,549 | 7,431 | 4,807 |
Other Properties | 94 | 114 | 95 | 4,829 |
Construction in Progress | 54,964 | 17,117 | 13,795 | 17,747 |
Leases | 37,091 | 38,973 | 35,853 | 6,373 |
Accumulated Depreciation | -7,556 | -4,510 | -2,877 | -2,922 |
•Goodwill And Other Intangible Assets | 31,665 | 0 | -- | -- |
Goodwill | 18,697 | 0 | -- | -- |
Other Intangible Assets | 12,968 | -- | -- | -- |
•Non Current Deferred Assets | -- | -- | 0 | 7 |
Non Current Deferred Taxes Assets | -- | -- | 0 | 7 |
Other Non Current Assets | 1,276 | -- | -- | -- |
•Total Liabilities Net Minority Interest | 553,452 | 351,483 | 137,480 | 124,623 |
•Current Liabilities | 124,832 | 98,831 | 81,533 | 95,180 |
•Payables And Accrued Expenses | 28,582 | 22,591 | 35,575 | 13,228 |
•Payables | 23,922 | 20,100 | 22,557 | 6,523 |
Accounts Payable | 23,922 | 20,100 | 22,557 | 6,523 |
Due to Related Parties Current | -- | -- | 3,493 | 442 |
Current Accrued Expenses | 4,660 | 2,491 | 13,018 | 6,705 |
Current Provisions | 6,996 | 7,890 | 5,457 | 10,120 |
•Current Debt And Capital Lease Obligation | 10,514 | 2,058 | 12,858 | 16,823 |
•Current Debt | -- | -- | 8,000 | 16,098 |
Other Current Borrowings | -- | -- | 8,000 | 16,098 |
Current Capital Lease Obligation | 10,514 | 2,058 | 4,858 | 725 |
•Current Deferred Liabilities | 45,712 | 54,803 | 22,896 | 39,831 |
Current Deferred Revenue | 45,712 | 54,803 | 22,896 | 39,831 |
Other Current Liabilities | 33,028 | 11,489 | 4,747 | 15,178 |
•Total Non Current Liabilities Net Minority Interest | 428,620 | 252,652 | 55,947 | 29,443 |
Long Term Provisions | -- | -- | -- | 2,188 |
•Long Term Debt And Capital Lease Obligation | 361,645 | 35,322 | 30,617 | 8,941 |
Long Term Debt | 335,335 | -- | -- | 3,863 |
Long Term Capital Lease Obligation | 26,310 | 35,322 | 30,617 | 5,078 |
•Non Current Deferred Liabilities | 6,341 | 14,334 | 0 | -- |
Non Current Deferred Revenue | 6,341 | 14,334 | 0 | -- |
Derivative Product Liabilities | 60,394 | 68,778 | 11,294 | 18,314 |
Preferred Securities Outside Stock Equity | -- | -- | 28,201 | 0 |
Other Non Current Liabilities | 240 | 134,218 | 14,036 | -- |
•Total Equity Gross Minority Interest | 203,702 | 3,921 | -51,572 | -57,619 |
•Stockholders' Equity | -748,351 | -1,003,272 | -233,234 | -57,619 |
•Capital Stock | 6,631 | 6,006 | 28,210 | 1 |
Preferred Stock | 6,613 | 5,990 | 28,201 | 0 |
Common Stock | 18 | 16 | 9 | 1 |
Additional Paid in Capital | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14,967 |
Retained Earnings | -721,457 | -996,453 | -248,619 | -72,587 |
Treasury Stock | 33,525 | 12,825 | 12,825 | 0 |
Minority Interest | 952,053 | 1,007,193 | 181,662 | 0 |
Total Capitalization | -413,016 | -1,003,272 | -233,234 | -53,756 |
Preferred Stock Equity | 6,613 | 5,990 | 28,201 | -- |
Common Stock Equity | -754,964 | -1,009,262 | -261,435 | -57,619 |
Capital Lease Obligations | 36,824 | 37,380 | 35,475 | 5,803 |
Net Tangible Assets | -780,016 | -1,003,272 | -233,234 | -57,619 |
Working Capital | 493,982 | 194,330 | -49,922 | -54,188 |
Invested Capital | -419,629 | -1,009,262 | -253,435 | -37,658 |
Tangible Book Value | -786,629 | -1,009,262 | -261,435 | -57,619 |
Total Debt | 372,159 | 37,380 | 43,475 | 25,764 |
Net Debt | -- | -- | 3,502 | -- |
Share Issued | 123,472.96 | 101,859 | 22,279.88 | 18,070.27 |
Ordinary Shares Number | 121,281.88 | 100,609 | 21,029.88 | 18,070.27 |
Treasury Shares Number | 2,191.08 | 1,250 | 1,250 | -- |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | Dec 2025 | Sep 2025 | Jun 2025 | Mar 2025 | Dec 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
•Total Assets | 757,154 | 753,530 | 475,639 | 500,014 | 355,404 |
•Current Assets | 618,814 | 665,984 | 396,753 | 431,312 | 293,161 |
•Cash, Cash Equivalents & Short Term Investments | 582,606 | 621,975 | 344,901 | 373,253 | 207,607 |
Cash And Cash Equivalents | 582,606 | 621,975 | 344,901 | 373,253 | 207,607 |
•Receivables | 24,421 | 30,477 | 41,953 | 41,391 | 62,872 |
Accounts receivable | 12,193 | 23,326 | 36,571 | 29,342 | 44,759 |
Other Receivables | 12,228 | 7,151 | 5,382 | 12,049 | 18,113 |
Restricted Cash | 2,733 | 2,042 | 2,042 | 2,042 | 2,042 |
Current Deferred Assets | 8 | 3,024 | 3,056 | 9,466 | 16,479 |
Other Current Assets | 9,046 | 8,466 | 4,801 | 5,160 | 4,161 |
•Total non-current assets | 138,340 | 87,546 | 78,886 | 68,702 | 62,243 |
•Net PPE | 105,399 | 86,313 | 78,379 | 68,126 | 62,243 |
•Gross PPE | 112,955 | 92,798 | 84,050 | 73,044 | 66,753 |
Properties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Machinery Furniture Equipment | 20,806 | 16,197 | 14,993 | 13,179 | 10,549 |
Other Properties | 94 | 102 | 37,772 | 38,333 | 114 |
Construction in Progress | 54,964 | 39,518 | 31,045 | 21,292 | 17,117 |
Leases | 37,091 | 36,981 | 240 | 240 | 38,973 |
Accumulated Depreciation | -7,556 | -6,485 | -5,671 | -4,918 | -4,510 |
•Goodwill And Other Intangible Assets | 31,665 | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Goodwill | 18,697 | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Other Intangible Assets | 12,968 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Other Non Current Assets | 1,276 | 1,233 | 507 | 576 | -- |
•Total Liabilities Net Minority Interest | 553,452 | 509,701 | 184,746 | 172,400 | 351,483 |
•Current Liabilities | 124,832 | 106,021 | 107,295 | 98,148 | 98,831 |
•Payables And Accrued Expenses | 28,582 | 34,124 | 37,902 | 37,891 | 22,591 |
•Payables | 23,922 | 17,988 | 26,447 | 28,717 | 20,100 |
Accounts Payable | 23,922 | 17,945 | 26,404 | 28,674 | 20,100 |
•Total Tax Payable | -- | 43 | 43 | 43 | -- |
Income Tax Payable | -- | 43 | 43 | 43 | -- |
•Current Accrued Expenses | 4,660 | 16,136 | 11,455 | 9,174 | 2,491 |
Interest Payable | -- | 1,030 | -- | -- | -- |
Current Provisions | 6,996 | 9,165 | 9,398 | 5,521 | 7,890 |
•Current Debt And Capital Lease Obligation | 10,514 | 6,294 | 2,160 | 2,127 | 2,058 |
Current Capital Lease Obligation | 10,514 | 6,294 | 2,160 | 2,127 | 2,058 |
•Current Deferred Liabilities | 45,712 | 56,438 | 57,835 | 52,410 | 54,803 |
Current Deferred Revenue | 45,712 | 56,438 | 57,835 | 52,410 | 54,803 |
Other Current Liabilities | 33,028 | -- | -- | 199 | 11,489 |
•Total Non Current Liabilities Net Minority Interest | 428,620 | 403,680 | 77,451 | 74,252 | 252,652 |
Long Term Provisions | -- | -- | 3,215 | -- | -- |
•Long Term Debt And Capital Lease Obligation | 361,645 | 364,946 | 35,185 | 35,259 | 35,322 |
Long Term Debt | 335,335 | 334,827 | -- | -- | -- |
Long Term Capital Lease Obligation | 26,310 | 30,119 | 35,185 | 35,259 | 35,322 |
•Non Current Deferred Liabilities | 6,341 | 1,636 | 0 | 12,960 | 14,334 |
Non Current Deferred Revenue | 6,341 | 1,636 | 0 | 12,960 | 14,334 |
Derivative Product Liabilities | 60,394 | 36,859 | 38,809 | 25,776 | 68,778 |
Other Non Current Liabilities | 240 | 239 | 242 | 257 | 134,218 |
•Total Equity Gross Minority Interest | 203,702 | 243,829 | 290,893 | 327,614 | 3,921 |
•Stockholders' Equity | -748,351 | -397,723 | -374,905 | -130,774 | -1,003,272 |
•Capital Stock | 6,631 | 6,469 | 6,309 | 6,157 | 6,006 |
Preferred Stock | 6,613 | 6,451 | 6,291 | 6,139 | 5,990 |
Common Stock | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 16 |
Additional Paid in Capital | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Retained Earnings | -721,457 | -370,667 | -347,689 | -103,406 | -996,453 |
Treasury Stock | 33,525 | 33,525 | 33,525 | 33,525 | 12,825 |
Minority Interest | 952,053 | 641,552 | 665,798 | 458,388 | 1,007,193 |
Total Capitalization | -413,016 | -62,896 | -374,905 | -130,774 | -1,003,272 |
Preferred Stock Equity | 6,613 | 6,451 | 6,291 | 6,139 | 5,990 |
Common Stock Equity | -754,964 | -404,174 | -381,196 | -136,913 | -1,009,262 |
Capital Lease Obligations | 36,824 | 36,413 | 37,345 | 37,386 | 37,380 |
Net Tangible Assets | -780,016 | -397,723 | -374,905 | -130,774 | -1,003,272 |
Working Capital | 493,982 | 559,963 | 289,458 | 333,164 | 194,330 |
Invested Capital | -419,629 | -69,347 | -381,196 | -136,913 | -1,009,262 |
Tangible Book Value | -786,629 | -404,174 | -381,196 | -136,913 | -1,009,262 |
Total Debt | 372,159 | 371,240 | 37,345 | 37,386 | 37,380 |
Net Debt | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Share Issued | 123,472.96 | 120,074.01 | 119,849.59 | 119,329.33 | 101,859 |
Ordinary Shares Number | 121,281.88 | 117,882.93 | 117,658.51 | 117,138.25 | 100,609 |
Treasury Shares Number | 2,191.08 | 2,191.08 | 2,191.08 | 2,191.08 | 1,250 |
| -14,318 |
| -14,318 |
| -57,587 |
| -45,279 |
| 784 |
Net Income from Continuing Operations | -106,846 | -106,846 | -346,922 | 10,140 | -6,405 |
•Operating Gains Losses | -8,384 | -8,384 | 170,787 | -6,353 | 97 |
Gain Loss On Sale of PPE | -- | -- | -- | 0 | 6 |
Gain Loss On Investment Securities | -8,384 | -8,384 | 170,787 | -6,353 | 91 |
•Depreciation Amortization Depletion | 3,597 | 3,597 | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
•Depreciation & amortization | 3,597 | 3,597 | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
Depreciation | -- | -- | 1,859 | 1,376 | 1,072 |
•Deferred Tax | 3,926 | 3,926 | 0 | 7 | -7 |
Deferred Income Tax | 3,926 | 3,926 | 0 | 7 | -7 |
Asset Impairment Charge | 3,431 | 3,431 | 5,484 | 128 | 836 |
Stock based compensation | 8,609 | 8,609 | 8,798 | 4,273 | 624 |
Other non-cash items | 36,513 | 36,513 | 120,182 | -66,209 | 13 |
•Change in working capital | 44,836 | 44,836 | -17,775 | 11,359 | 4,554 |
•Change in Receivables | 52,723 | 52,723 | -56,421 | -14,253 | -3,883 |
Changes in Account Receivables | 30,334 | 30,334 | -28,319 | -14,743 | 1,252 |
Change in Prepaid Assets | -5,966 | -5,966 | -481 | -1,435 | -5,699 |
•Change in Payables And Accrued Expense | -3,128 | -3,128 | -4,264 | 18,532 | 3,648 |
•Change in Payable | -3,128 | -3,128 | -4,264 | 18,532 | 3,648 |
Change in Account Payable | -3,128 | -3,128 | -4,264 | 18,532 | 3,648 |
Change in Other Current Assets | 2,503 | 2,503 | 1,334 | 1,165 | -2,999 |
Change in Other Current Liabilities | 14,513 | 14,513 | 3,910 | 17,191 | 14,803 |
Change in Other Working Capital | -15,809 | -15,809 | 38,147 | -9,841 | -1,316 |
•Investing Cash Flow | -56,580 | -56,580 | -10,111 | -29,911 | -16,405 |
•Cash Flow from Continuing Investing Activities | -56,580 | -56,580 | -10,111 | -29,911 | -16,405 |
•Net PPE Purchase And Sale | -41,634 | -41,634 | -10,111 | -29,911 | -16,405 |
Purchase of PPE | -41,634 | -41,634 | -10,111 | -29,911 | -16,405 |
•Net Intangibles Purchase And Sale | -63 | -63 | 0 | -- | -- |
Purchase of Intangibles | -63 | -63 | 0 | -- | -- |
•Net Business Purchase And Sale | -14,883 | -14,883 | 0 | -- | -- |
Purchase of Business | -14,883 | -14,883 | 0 | -- | -- |
•Financing Cash Flow | 446,588 | 446,588 | 272,787 | 53,924 | 12,096 |
•Cash Flow from Continuing Financing Activities | 446,588 | 446,588 | 272,787 | 53,924 | 12,096 |
•Net Issuance Payments of Debt | 335,513 | 335,513 | -8,000 | -12,000 | 7,840 |
•Net Long Term Debt Issuance | 335,513 | 335,513 | -8,000 | -12,000 | 7,840 |
Long Term Debt Issuance | 335,513 | 335,513 | 10,000 | 0 | 7,948 |
Long Term Debt Payments | 0 | 0 | -18,000 | -12,000 | -108 |
•Net Common Stock Issuance | -20,700 | -20,700 | 0 | -- | 6 |
Common Stock Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | 6 |
Common Stock Payments | -20,700 | -20,700 | 0 | -- | -- |
•Net Preferred Stock Issuance | -- | -- | 0 | 26,000 | 0 |
Preferred Stock Issuance | -- | -- | 0 | 26,000 | 0 |
•Cash Dividends Paid | -- | -- | 0 | -7,952 | 0 |
Common Stock Dividend Paid | -- | -- | 0 | -7,952 | 0 |
Proceeds from Stock Option Exercised | 176,554 | 176,554 | 61,561 | 16,124 | 4,250 |
Net Other Financing Charges | -44,779 | -44,779 | 219,226 | 31,752 | 6 |
•End Cash Position | 585,339 | 585,339 | 209,649 | 4,560 | 25,826 |
Changes in Cash | 375,690 | 375,690 | 205,089 | -21,266 | -3,525 |
Beginning Cash Position | 209,649 | 209,649 | 4,560 | 25,826 | 29,351 |
Income Tax Paid Supplemental Data | 35 | 35 | 613 | 35 | 0 |
Interest Paid Supplemental Data | 0 | 0 | 408 | 1,919 | 1,013 |
Capital Expenditure | -41,697 | -41,697 | -10,111 | -29,911 | -16,405 |
Issuance of Capital Stock | -- | -- | 0 | 26,000 | 0 |
Issuance of Debt | 335,513 | 335,513 | 10,000 | 0 | 7,948 |
Repayment of Debt | 0 | 0 | -18,000 | -12,000 | -108 |
Repurchase of Capital Stock | -20,700 | -20,700 | 0 | -- | -- |
Free Cash Flow | -56,015 | -56,015 | -67,698 | -75,190 | -15,621 |
| All numbers in thousands (USD) | TTM | Dec 2025 | Sep 2025 | Jun 2025 | Mar 2025 | Dec 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
•Operating Cash Flow | -14,318 | -7,295 | -7,179 | -19,263 | 19,419 | -1,965 |
•Cash Flow from Continuing Operating Activities | -14,318 | -7,295 | -7,179 | -19,263 | 19,419 | -1,965 |
Net Income from Continuing Operations | -106,846 | -59,655 | -9,960 | -38,206 | 975 | -165,135 |
•Operating Gains Losses | -8,384 | 23,535 | -1,950 | 13,033 | -43,002 | 66,066 |
Gain Loss On Investment Securities | -8,384 | 23,535 | -1,950 | 13,033 | -43,002 | 66,066 |
•Depreciation Amortization Depletion | 3,597 | 1,407 | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
•Depreciation & amortization | 3,597 | 1,407 | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
Depreciation | -- | -- | 815 | 752 | 623 | 540 |
•Deferred Tax | 3,926 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Deferred Income Tax | 3,926 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Asset Impairment Charge | 3,431 | 3,296 | 0 | 135 | 0 | 0 |
Stock based compensation | 8,609 | 1,829 | 1,416 | 2,520 | 2,844 | 1,618 |
Other non-cash items | 36,513 | 2,724 | 243 | -17 | 33,563 | 86,258 |
•Change in working capital | 44,836 | 15,643 | 2,257 | 2,520 | 24,416 | 8,688 |
•Change in Receivables | 52,723 | 7,053 | 11,479 | 5,696 | 28,495 | -6,467 |
Changes in Account Receivables | 30,334 | 9,081 | 13,216 | -7,381 | 15,418 | 6,552 |
Change in Prepaid Assets | -5,966 | -473 | -4,362 | 445 | -1,576 | -426 |
•Change in Payables And Accrued Expense | -3,128 | 1,336 | -6,327 | -5,782 | 7,645 | -6,696 |
•Change in Payable | -3,128 | 1,336 | -6,327 | -5,782 | 7,645 | -6,696 |
Change in Account Payable | -3,128 | 1,336 | -6,327 | -5,782 | 7,645 | -6,696 |
Change in Other Current Assets | 2,503 | 466 | 930 | 560 | 547 | 482 |
Change in Other Current Liabilities | 14,513 | 11,346 | 4,385 | 851 | -2,069 | -2,038 |
Change in Other Working Capital | -15,809 | -4,085 | -3,848 | 750 | -8,626 | 23,833 |
•Investing Cash Flow | -56,580 | -30,593 | -11,811 | -8,054 | -6,122 | -4,926 |
•Cash Flow from Continuing Investing Activities | -56,580 | -30,593 | -11,811 | -8,054 | -6,122 | -4,926 |
•Net PPE Purchase And Sale | -41,634 | -15,647 | -11,811 | -8,054 | -6,122 | -4,926 |
Purchase of PPE | -41,634 | -15,647 | -11,811 | -8,054 | -6,122 | -4,926 |
•Net Intangibles Purchase And Sale | -63 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Purchase of Intangibles | -63 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
•Net Business Purchase And Sale | -14,883 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
Purchase of Business | -14,883 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
•Financing Cash Flow | 446,588 | -790 | 296,064 | -1,035 | 152,349 | 124,893 |
•Cash Flow from Continuing Financing Activities | 446,588 | -790 | 296,064 | -1,035 | 152,349 | 124,893 |
•Net Issuance Payments of Debt | 335,513 | 0 | 335,513 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
•Net Long Term Debt Issuance | 335,513 | 0 | 335,513 | -- | -- | 0 |
Long Term Debt Issuance | 335,513 | 0 | 335,513 | -- | -- | 0 |
Long Term Debt Payments | 0 | 0 | 0 | -- | -- | 0 |
•Net Short Term Debt Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | -- |
Short Term Debt Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | -- |
Short Term Debt Payments | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | -- |
•Net Common Stock Issuance | -20,700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -20,700 | -- |
Common Stock Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | -- |
Common Stock Payments | -20,700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -20,700 | -- |
•Net Preferred Stock Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Preferred Stock Issuance | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
•Cash Dividends Paid | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Common Stock Dividend Paid | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 |
Proceeds from Stock Option Exercised | 176,554 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 176,554 | 9,901 |
Net Other Financing Charges | -44,779 | -790 | -39,449 | -1,035 | -3,505 | 114,992 |
•End Cash Position | 585,339 | 585,339 | 624,017 | 346,943 | 375,295 | 209,649 |
Changes in Cash | 375,690 | -38,678 | 277,074 | -28,352 | 165,646 | 118,002 |
Beginning Cash Position | 209,649 | 624,017 | 346,943 | 375,295 | 209,649 | 91,647 |
Income Tax Paid Supplemental Data | 35 | 30 | 5 | -66 | 66 | 336 |
Interest Paid Supplemental Data | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Capital Expenditure | -41,697 | -15,710 | -11,811 | -8,054 | -6,122 | -4,926 |
Issuance of Capital Stock | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | 0 |
Issuance of Debt | 335,513 | 0 | 335,513 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Repayment of Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Repurchase of Capital Stock | -20,700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -20,700 | -- |
Free Cash Flow | -56,015 | -23,005 | -18,990 | -27,317 | 13,297 | -6,891 |
| Dec 2025 |
| 3.79% |
| 120,792,625 | 4,764,995 | mutual_fund | SPDR SERIES TRUST-State Street SPDR S&P Aerospace & Defense ETF | Mar 2026 | 2.98% |
| 91,095,834 | 3,593,524 | institutional | Shaw D.E. & Co., Inc. | Dec 2025 | 2.25% |
| 82,296,849 | 3,246,424 | institutional | Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania | Dec 2025 | 2.03% |
| 80,150,820 | 3,161,768 | mutual_fund | VANGUARD INDEX FUNDS-Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund | Dec 2025 | 1.98% |
| 78,467,960 | 3,095,383 | institutional | UBS Group AG | Dec 2025 | 1.94% |
| 71,336,523 | 2,814,064 | institutional | Voya Investment Management LLC | Dec 2025 | 1.76% |
| 70,558,582 | 2,783,376 | institutional | Point72 Asset Management, L.P. | Dec 2025 | 1.74% |
| 69,336,332 | 2,735,161 | institutional | Geode Capital Management, LLC | Dec 2025 | 1.71% |
| 67,964,212 | 2,681,034 | mutual_fund | iShares Trust-iShares Russell 2000 ETF | Mar 2026 | 1.68% |
| 67,661,153 | 2,669,079 | institutional | Frontier Capital Management Company LLC | Dec 2025 | 1.67% |
| 47,712,275 | 1,882,141 | mutual_fund | ARK ETF Trust-ARK Autonomous Technology & Robotics ETF | Feb 2026 | 1.18% |
| 32,132,545 | 1,267,556 | mutual_fund | iShares Trust-iShares U.S. Aerospace & Defense ETF | Mar 2026 | 0.79% |
| 30,766,053 | 1,213,651 | mutual_fund | VANGUARD INDEX FUNDS-Vanguard Extended Market Index Fund | Dec 2025 | 0.76% |
| 26,868,972 | 1,059,920 | mutual_fund | Fidelity Salem Street Trust-Fidelity Small Cap Index Fund | Jan 2026 | 0.66% |
| 22,823,923 | 900,352 | mutual_fund | iShares Trust-iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF | Mar 2026 | 0.56% |
| 18,195,216 | 717,760 | mutual_fund | ARK ETF Trust-ARK Space & Defense Innovation ETF | Feb 2026 | 0.45% |
| 15,423,954 | 608,440 | mutual_fund | Procure ETF Trust II-Procure Space ETF | Jan 2026 | 0.38% |
What Must Go Right: The base case requires successful mission execution, disciplined integration of acquired platforms, better manufacturing control, and gradual movement toward higher-margin network, navigation, and services revenue. Management must use the current cash balance to bridge toward operating improvement rather than to fund recurring losses indefinitely. If contract execution improves and cash burn narrows, the market may continue giving the company time to prove the broader platform thesis.
What Must Go Wrong: The base case weakens if revenue remains event-driven, if the trailing decline persists, or if operating margins stay deeply negative even after acquisitions and new programs scale. It also fails if the market stops rewarding mission visibility and begins valuing the company strictly on current cash economics and program profitability.
Bull Case
In the bull case, Intuitive Machines proves that early lunar heritage, acquisitions, and communications-network ambitions can combine into a durable space infrastructure franchise. Backlog converts cleanly, spacecraft manufacturing and national-security work broaden the customer base, and Near Space Network Services plus data-processing capabilities create more persistent, higher-margin revenue. Gross margin improves meaningfully, operating cash flow turns positive, and the market gains confidence that LUNR can evolve into an emerging prime rather than a speculative lunar contractor.
What Must Go Right: The bull case needs sustained positive operating cash flow, materially better gross margins, successful mission cadence, and visible revenue contribution from network and services offerings. KinetX, Lanteris, and new satellite communications investments must strengthen platform economics rather than simply expand the scope of execution risk. The company also needs to maintain NASA, defense, and national-security credibility while managing export-control, cybersecurity, and mission-assurance obligations.
What Must Go Wrong: The bull case breaks if network revenues are delayed, acquired capabilities remain difficult to integrate, larger aerospace primes capture the most attractive cislunar infrastructure work, or technical setbacks damage customer trust. It would also be capped if positive strategic news fails to translate into positive cash generation, because the current valuation already prices in significant future success.